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4. Post- colonial Antarctica
Klaus Dodds and Christy Collis
Shortly after Dodds published an essay in Polar Record entitled ‘Post- colonial 
Antarctica: an emerging engagement’, leading postcolonial theorists posited the ‘The 
end of  post- colonial theory?’ in the journal PMLA (Publications of  the Modern 
Language Association). Lambasting postcolonial theory as irrelevant, parochial and 
 Anglo- centric,1 their piece captured a powerful current of  discontent. But for Robert 
Young, a leading theorist of  post- colonialism and author of  field- setting introductions 
to postcolonial theory and practice, such an obituary seemed out of  place and time. As 
Young opined in a lengthy essay titled ‘Postcolonial remains’ published in New Literary 
History in 2012:
The desire to pronounce postcolonial theory dead on both sides of the Atlantic suggests that 
its presence continues to disturb and provoke anxiety: the real problem lies in the fact that the 
postcolonial remains. Why does it continue to unsettle people so much? The aspiring morticians 
of the postcolonial concur in scarcely relating it to the world from which it comes from and for 
which it claims to speak: that outside Europe and North America.
As this debate suggests, postcolonialism is a wide- ranging and dense academic field, 
with theoretical and practical but also political agendas – including whether to use either 
postcolonial (denoting an academic field) or post- colonial, where the latter usually refers 
to the formal ending of imperial rule. Postcolonial thinking, however, posits that colonial-
ism and colonial imaginaries and practices are as relevant as ever and that scholars need 
to remain attentive to spatial and temporal variations around the globe.2 Antarctica merits 
attention in that regard.
This chapter explores how postcolonial perspectives have informed and indeed con-
tributed to ‘critical Antarctic studies’, which itself  is attendant to the intersection of inter 
alia colonialism, exploration, race, gender, nationalism, and sexuality. A decade on from 
that essay on ‘post- colonial Antarctica’, we would select a different word to ‘emerging’ 
and propose instead ‘an unsettling engagement’. Postcolonial engagements are unsettling 
in large part because they posit challenges to dominant, taken- for- granted systems of 
power- knowledge, and emphasize historical and continuing violence, domination, and 
inequality. The dominant and privileged position of the Euro- American world is, as a 
consequence of postcolonial challenging and questioning, unsettled. When juxtaposed 
with the colonial experiences of the Arctic, Ireland, Caribbean, Asia, and Africa, the 
Antarctic and Southern Ocean appear to be outliers in large part because of an absence 
of an indigenous human population and an absence of race- based violence. But what 
postcolonial and other critical scholars have brought to bear in the last decade or so is an 
insistence that postcolonial ‘unsettlement’ should not exclude apparently remote, empty, 
and desert- like environments. The Australian historian Tom Griffiths articulates this well 
with reference to the Australian encounter, building on the earlier scholarship of Christy 
Collis and Brigid Hains:
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For adventurous and scientific Australians of the 20th century, two frontiers beckoned: the white 
desert and the red heart, the far south and the outback. Adelaide where [the Anglo- Australian 
explorer Douglas] Mawson gained a lecturing post in his twenties, was sandwiched between these 
two frontiers; it was a city exposed to the winds of both deserts . . . Mawson thought Antarctica 
might become an ‘Alaska’ to Australia’s United States, a new frontier for a ‘young’ nation.3
Mawson’s early- twentieth- century musings provide invaluable insights as to how a 
 generation of Australians viewed the geographical and cultural proximity of the polar 
continent and surrounding Southern Ocean. They also reveal something of the proprie-
tary nature of that geographical imagination. Unlike the ‘Alaskan purchase’ by the United 
States from the Russian Empire, however, the acquisition of Antarctica was not facilitated 
by monetary exchange. Rather it was literally grounded in similarity: regarding Antarctica 
as if  it was a frontier space, albeit without an indigenous human population. The white 
desert, as Christy Collis noted, proved alluring to Australians already versed in encounters 
and experiences of the ‘red desert’.4 As Griffiths perceptively noted, Australians past and 
present have enjoyed, and even taken comfort in, remarking upon the similarities between 
the two frontiers. As he opines, ‘one claimed by fire and the other by ice – providing vital, 
formative experiences of the frontier in a settler nation’.5 As Adrian Howkins recalled, 
the US engagement with Antarctica was also informed and inflamed by a frontier imagi-
nation, led by explorers such as Richard Byrd who envisaged a colonializing network of 
‘Little America[s]’.6 As Stephen Pyne remarked, ‘Byrd envisaged a society in Antarctica 
and cast himself  in the role of colonizer. He was the first man to consider Antarctica as a 
site for quasi- permanent settlement, not simply as terra incognita awaiting geographical 
discovery or an arena for individual exploits’.7 What a postcolonial perspective offers is 
reflection on how the frontier is always a project of imaginary and political power. The 
metaphorical and material power of the ‘Antarctic frontier’ is not something buried in the 
past; it continues to underpin contemporary manifestations of polar geopolitics.8
We offer three interventions around this term ‘postcolonial Antarctic’ and one that 
situates itself  within a field of ‘critical Antarctic studies’. These interventions signal the 
analytical productivity of viewing Antarctic geopolitics and discourses through a postco-
lonial lens. Postcolonial perspectives do not assume the Antarctic to be ‘exceptional’ or 
de novo. They do not assume that the Antarctic cannot be understood within a broader 
history and geography of colonialism and imperialism. Postcolonial theorizing co- exists 
with other forms of critical scholarship on race, sexuality, gender, and nationalism.9 This 
chapter’s first intervention addresses settler colonialism(s), which transformed the inhabi-
tation of the polar continent and the exploitation/harvesting of resources, especially in 
the surrounding oceans and seas. This academic intervention has fundamentally called 
into question the role of states and associated nationalisms that ‘naturalize’ Antarctic 
territory. The second intervention addresses the 1959 Antarctic Treaty and Antarctic 
Treaty System (ATS) as a form of colonial- scientific governance and questions how it was 
managed and evaluated in the midst of political decolonization and Cold War geopolitics. 
The effects and affects are still being felt today in terms of how knowledge claims help 
manage the continent’s exploitation and preservation while preserving original settler 
colonialism(s). The final intervention explores interest in Asian states’ involvement in 
Antarctica, and how that alerts us to how rival knowledge claims, political practices and 
long- term  ambitions work to shape the understanding and management of the Antarctic 
and Southern Ocean. What a ‘postcolonial Antarctic’ does is to alert us to the presence 
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of what can be termed a ‘polar orientalism’, with regard to Edward Said’s legacy on the 
legacies of Euro- American colonialism, which challenges the Euro- American polar order. 
The chapter is, thus, different in style and content from Dodds’s earlier intervention in 
2006, which did not posit the existence of a body of work called ‘critical Antarctic studies’.
Before commencing postcolonial analysis of Antarctica, it is crucial to note that post-
colonialism does not necessarily entail a righteous pointing of fingers at ‘nasty imperial-
ists’. The term ‘colonial’ is used a great deal in many different ways. It has been used so 
widely, and to stand for so many things, that it has become at best a vague pejorative 
portmanteau for ‘powerful and bad’. With the term so negatively loaded, and so diffuse 
in meaning, affixing it to Antarctica can seem judgmental. Pejorative judgement is not 
the purpose of this chapter however. The fact that the states and individuals involved 
in Antarctica today are not nasty and rapacious does not erase the fact of that the bulk 
of the continent is claimed by a handful of states on the basis of ‘discovery, claim, and 
occupation’. The fact that Antarctica has no indigenous population makes Antarctican 
colonialism different from more northern varieties, but it does not diminish it. The point 
here is that colonialism takes many different forms, and it does not necessarily mean ‘evil 
empires bent on plunder’. Australia’s massive claim to Antarctica, for example, may have 
started off  in part as a claim to minerals and whale stocks, but it is now focused heavily 
on  environmental protection and understanding. The Australian government may sub-
stantiate its polar claim by building bases and funding Australians to inhabit them, but 
this does not make these people mindless dupes of government, or rapacious colonists. 
Scientists, artists, researchers, and base support workers, as well as government workers, 
travel to and work on Antarctica for a number of reasons, most of them because they love 
the place, they are fascinated by it, and they want to help, protect, and understand it. But 
love doesn’t cancel colonialism. ‘Colonialism’ here then, is used as an objective framework 
for understanding the geopolitics, territorial division, and discourses of Antarctica.
NATURALIZED TERRITORY: POSTCOLONIALISM AND 
CRITICAL ANTARCTIC STUDIES
Postcolonial scholars, in the main, are driven by a commitment to investigate and 
 interrogate the history of colonialism and its aftermaths, and how it persists. Resistant to 
straightforward- sounding categories such as the ‘end of empire’ or ‘decolonization’, the 
‘colonial present’ (in Derek Gregory’s words) is the starting point for further  reflection.10 
Challenging amnesiac histories of colonialism, postcolonial approaches are in part 
about recovering and retrieving those histories and experiences obscured by dominant 
 accounting and auditing of imperial enterprises, while at the same time sounding a 
warning that colonial institutions, discourses, and practices are part of the here and now 
and not confined to a distant historical epoch.
In other words, the past is very much in evidence in the present, stubbornly persisting 
through such categories as hierarchies of knowledge, experience and language, which 
enable white, Euro- American, and Anglophone worlds to emerge as hegemonic; even if  
postcolonial and International Relations (IR) scholars are increasingly grappling with 
the etymologies of ‘China/Asian’ rising powers and its implications for a post- colonial 
encounter shaped by spatial divisions between North and South.11
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The postcolonial unsettles by making visible power- knowledge hierarchies, and encour-
aging and facilitating the periphery to ‘write back’, ‘to act up’ and take its ‘proper place’ 
in the making of pasts, presents, and futures. How might such an approach be relevant to 
the Antarctic, a space not filled with a human history and settlement stretching into the 
millennia? Some twenty years ago, Lisa Bloom’s seminal text Gender on the Ice brought 
Arctic and to a lesser extent Antarctic studies into conversation with critical scholarship 
on gender, race, and nationalism.12 Bloom’s work emerged at a time when a new genera-
tion of scholars reinterpreted narratives of polar exploration and exploitation, but also 
took fresh approaches to the Antarctic Treaty and the post- Treaty period of international 
scientific management. Bloom, however, was not the first to use the prism of gender to 
make sense of the distinctly masculine (and masculinist) encounter with Antarctica. 
Elizabeth Chipman’s account, Women on the Ice, offered a welcome intervention in that 
regard.13
In retrospect, we might see this period as the start of a ‘critical Antarctic studies’, as 
contemporary social science and humanities- based theorizing was brought to bear on a 
part of the world that had been defined by appeals to bio- geographical, geographical, 
historical, and political exceptionality. A recent edited volume entitled Critical Arctic 
Studies conveys well something similar in the scholarship produced on the communities, 
ecosystems, and geopolitical relationships within and beyond the northern latitudes.14 The 
Antarctic and Southern Ocean were remoter and colder than other parts of the world and 
were often seen as politically irrelevant because of the ‘political anaesthetic’ applied in the 
form of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty. Using the analogy of the ‘anaesthetic’ is a deliberate 
one because it implies that the ‘patient’ (that is Antarctica) might well awaken at any time. 
For some observers, however, the Antarctic was a ‘pole apart’ because, unlike other areas 
of the world, this was a region apparently characterized by enduring peace, co- operation, 
international harmony and even the absence of colonial rivalries.15 Laurence Gould, a 
distinguished American polar geologist, claimed, in 1960, that the Antarctic Treaty would 
take its place alongside the Magna Carta (1215) as indicative of human enlightenment.16 
These common ‘exceptionalism’ claims have until recently made the application of post-
colonial analysis to Antarctica seem irrelevant at best, and at worst, unfair. But Antarctica 
is part of the world, and in order to understand it, it is crucial that it not be segregated 
from the complex ideological and geopolitical dynamics by which it is shaped.
This notion of the Antarctic being quite different to other parts of the world mani-
fests itself  most clearly in discussions about colonialism, settler or otherwise. Critical 
Antarctican scholars have demonstrated that Antarctica is and always has been articulated 
to the power/knowledge configurations that shape the more temperate world. One vein 
of critical polar scholarship, for example, attends to the role of class in Antarctic history 
and discourse. In the absence of an indigenous human population, the human history of 
the Antarctic and Southern Ocean has been one largely narrated through the prism of 
heroic polar and oceanic exploration, stretching from eighteenth- century maritime voy-
aging to twentieth- century sledging and flying over the polar interior.17 It has been one 
that has concentrated on heroic explorers and what Ben Maddison terms ‘the masters’ 
rather than the Antarctic working classes.18 Maddison showed that sailors, sealers, and 
whalers were vital elements to the interplay of polar exploration, commerce, and science. 
If  Maddison brought class and colonialism into conversation with one another, Collis 
used  early- twentieth- and mid- century Australian encounters with the Antarctic to 
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reconsider how the southern oceanic and polar worlds were discovered, encountered, 
proclaimed, and administered by men as opposed to women. By examining the embod-
ied performances of men such as Douglas Mawson and expeditions such as the 1929–31 
BANZARE (British, Australian and New Zealand Antarctic Research Expeditions), 
she makes the case for how Antarctic colonialism was enacted through a series of manly 
performances on the rock, ice, and water of the far south. Critical Antarctican studies 
have thus worked to foreground and denaturalize the specific discourses, practices, and 
knowledge configurations which shape human interaction with the polar south.
A postcolonial analysis points out that the legal geopolitics of Antarctica are similarly 
grounded in existing power dynamics. The bulk of Antarctica is claimed by seven states; 
of these, five base their claims on ‘discovery, claim, and occupation’. According to interna-
tional territorial law written during the period of European imperial expansion, a state may 
make sovereign claim to terra nullius – or, land owned by no one – through standardized 
rituals of discovery. In these rituals, an explorer must first be authorized by the government 
to act as an agent of territorial claim. Once that authorized body touches terra nullius, plants 
a flag, reads a proclamation of possession, and then returns the documentation of that event 
in the forms of photographs, journals, and maps; the explorer’s state gains inchoate – or 
partial – title to that territory. Inchoate title is solidified into full territorial  possession once 
the state permanently occupies its claim;19 for example, through year- round research sta-
tions. Australia, the UK, Norway, New Zealand, and France base their sovereignty claims 
to Antarctica through this colonial process of legal territorial acquisition, the same process 
that was used to transform Australia into a British possession. The colonial law of occupa-
tion helps to explain why each of these states has at least one permanent research station in 
its territorial claim,20 and why some states, such as Australia – which claims the largest ‘slice’ 
of Antarctica – build research stations only in their claimed territories. Understanding the 
colonial background of these states’ legal claims to Antarctic territory explains the siting 
of these stations. Postcolonial analysis, then, points out not only the discursive, but also 
the legal and the material nature of Antarctican geopolitics. To imagine that Antarctica is 
somehow exempt from colonialism is to miss one of the  fundamental dynamics which has 
shaped human engagements with the continent.
The ‘discovery and occupation’ mode of acquisition echoed a settler colonialism 
already implemented in Australia. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, expeditions 
criss- crossing the Australian continent played a considerable role in claiming, colonizing, 
and inhabiting the coastline and interior. As settler colonists, those white travellers came 
to stay in environments and landscapes largely thought of as ‘deserts’; not in a literal sense 
necessarily but in the sense of being thought of as devoid of culture, thinly populated 
and in need of European ‘improvement’. Settler colonialism involved the creation of 
infrastructure, institutions, as well as administration and policing – ‘settler sovereignty’. 
Scholars such as Tom Griffiths have also detected uncanny similarities between ‘interior’ 
settler colonialism and a polar colonialism. Having attained independence only in 1900, 
Australia felt the need to emphasize its own national strength (in addition to demonstrat-
ing its vitality within the British Empire), and many looked to the Antarctic frontier. 
Undertaken by men and underscored by a white imperial masculinity, this polar form of 
settler colonialism was distinctive in terms of the intersection of nationalism, race, and 
gender, but unquestionably considered possible even in the absence of indigenous native 
communities.
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Although we frequently think of Antarctica as a space in which all human presence 
is transient, as with other forms of settler colonialism(s), these men ‘came to stay’. 
While the physical environments and extreme climates posed challenges and certainly 
unsettled expedition life; institution building, ‘improvement’, and later permanent set-
tlement accompanied such ventures. Postcolonial scholarship into the early phases of 
Antarctic exploration and colonization are buttressed by a revisionist investigation into 
‘Heroic era’ exploration and discovery, which considered how the icy adventures of Scott, 
Shackleton, and others were caught up in a matrix of colonial logics of acquisition and 
 administration.21 Resource exploitation in the form of sealing and whaling contributed to 
making these territories ‘productive’ and even ‘improved’. As Peder Roberts reminds us in 
his comparative analysis of British and Scandinavian colonial/imperial engagements with 
the Antarctic, the management of living resources such as the whale was hugely signifi-
cant not only in consolidating control over the Southern Ocean and islands such as South 
Georgia, but also in helping to legitimate and justify the Anglo- Norwegian presence as 
a managerial necessity – a kind of benevolent administration of non- human actors and 
environments.22
It was not until the post- 1945 era, however, that settler colonialism entered into what 
is sometimes dubbed a new phase, the so- called ‘permanent era’. Research stations, like 
the frontier outposts in other parts of the world, doubled as scientific and administrative 
hubs. Scientists were often asked to perform multiple roles: as researchers, as administra-
tors, and as legal officers. The scientific station, as Collis suggests, became complicit with 
the colonization of Antarctica and helped to consolidate the presence of those who were 
either part and parcel of the claimant community and/or others who reserved their rights 
with regard to pressing a formal claim to the polar continent.23
Shirley Scott notes that the seven territorial claims made in the Antarctic by Argentina, 
Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom were based on 
varying rationales and justifications.24 Argentinian and Chilean polar territories were an 
imperial inheritance from Spain, which had been granted title by a 1493 Papal Bull that 
encapsulated all lands from the North Pole to the South Pole, west of the Cape Verde 
Islands. Geological and geographical continuity and proximity helped to bind portions 
of the Antarctic Peninsula region to the southern tips of their respective continental 
territories as integral parts of the nation, as did the bull, which dates from the period of 
Spanish imperial dominance. By way of contrast, the UK and its former Dominions of 
Australia and New Zealand (in an explicitly imperial British context) based their claims on 
prior discovery and exploration; later strengthened by resource management, year- round 
settlement, and scientific mapping and research. In the UK context, the establishment of 
the Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey (FIDS) in 1945 after a secret wartime naval 
operation (codenamed Operation Tabarin) was designed to use mapping, surveying, and 
meteorology as colonial modes of governance tied to a network of central  government 
departments (including the Colonial Office, the Directorate of Colonial/Overseas 
Surveys, and the Foreign Office) and institutions (including the Scott Polar Research 
Institute at Cambridge University). Antarctic colonialism, in other words, has never been 
a continentally homogenous dynamic.
As these colonial modes of governance matured, so the Antarctic became ever more 
measured, collected, dated, and administered. And as such, the claims also became more 
firmly established as the legal colonies of their claimants: in the Lockean logic of the 
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international law of colonial territorial acquisition, surveying and administration of land 
are core mechanisms of ‘effective occupation’, particularly in the case of land judged to 
be largely uninhabitable. The seven claimant states and others, such as the United States 
and Soviet Union, established a powerful modus operandi; a way of framing the Antarctic 
as a space to be governed through the privileging of science, the work of scientists, and 
the practices of mapping and surveying, which included radio- echoing investigations of 
the thickness of the polar ice sheet. This work did not come to pass straightforwardly 
however. Recent critical scholarship, for example, on the International Geophysical Year 
(IGY) 1957–8 illustrates well that this relationship between geopolitics, science, and 
governance was complex, as interested parties engaged with the rationale of IGY while 
at the same time engaging in hedging strategies.25 Not one of the twelve participants in 
the Antarctic component of the IGY assumed that there would be a lasting political set-
tlement after the IGY itself. The mere fact that there were only twelve participants says 
something about how limited that political- scientific engagement was with Antarctica in 
the 1940s and 1950s.
However limited that engagement was in terms of the states involved, the Antarctic 
was being bordered, divided, and demarcated as well as measured in terms of height 
and depth. The permanent research stations helped to indigenize the colonization of the 
Antarctic as residents began to live there all year round. As individuals they returned 
eventually to home locations, but collectively the permanent occupation and inhabita-
tion of the Antarctic was a turning point in the human encounter with this southern 
polar world. Because their claims were not based on discovery and claim of terra nullius, 
Chile and Argentina opted for a different mode of colonization, and set up permanent 
communities in their Antarctic claims. Their colonization included women, children, and 
schools, as well as the scientists and administrators deployed by the other claimants. As 
the human occupation became permanent, greater resources were devoted to measuring 
not just the physical geographies of the polar continent and its seas but also its birds, 
 penguins, seals, and whales. The indigenous faunal populations of Antarctica were, as 
with the aboriginal populations elsewhere in the world, ordered and classified with the 
aid of investment from states. Viewed through a postcolonial perspective, this ostensibly 
neutral scientific engagement becomes more complex, and the articulation of scientific 
practice and  colonial geopolitics becomes clear.
WHITE PRIVILEGE? ANTARCTICA AS A PROMISED LAND
One of the most powerful orthodoxies regarding the emergence and signing of the 
Antarctic Treaty revolves around citing and siting the far- sightedness of those who found 
themselves around the negotiating table between October and December 1959. At play 
was an intriguing political culture of invisibility and visibility. While the focus was on 
diplomatic negotiations and the signing ceremony, less attention was given to the element 
of colonial dispossession. In the opening statements of Antarctic Treaty delegations, 
the claimant states were quick to emphasize their geographical proximity and historical 
connection to the continent. What no one dwelt upon was the politics and practices of 
claiming: the flags planted, the maps drawn, the bases built in the hope of persuading 
others of the viability of their exclusive claims to the polar continent. As Robert Young 
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notes, ‘the task of the postcolonial is to make the invisible, in this sense, visible’ and as 
such as we might ask what can be done to re- position this pivotal period in Antarctica’s 
geopolitical history.26
Just before the Antarctic Treaty, the politics of Antarctican territorial possession and 
influence had undergone a moment of tension: in the creation of the post- war 1951 Treaty 
of Peace between Japan and the allied powers, Australia and New Zealand were insistent 
that Japan be forced to renounce forever any claims to Antarctic land.27 Like New Zealand 
and Australia, Japan had mounted a polar expedition, but unlike Australia and New 
Zealand, it had not commenced occupation or formal claiming of specific polar territory. 
Curiously, Japan had not demonstrated any intention to encroach upon either Australia’s 
or New Zealand’s polar claims; the vehemence of these states’ stance on Japanese polar 
claiming seemed to stem more from a colonial sensibility about which states ‘belonged’, 
and which did not, to the exclusive club of Antarctican territorial possession and control.
The Antarctic Treaty conference occurred at a moment of great transformation as 
European empires were dismantled, and the idea of a ‘Third World’ gained political cur-
rency. The emerging nation- states, some of whom were profoundly altered by partition, 
such as India and Pakistan, were eager to claim their own space in a world deeply divided by 
the Cold War. Decolonization was a process rather than an outcome, and ‘emergencies’ in 
British- controlled Cyprus, Kenya, and Malaya were significant in the way in which decolo-
nization was performed and staged.28 Frank Furedi has labelled this era (c.  1945–1960) as 
shot through with anxieties about ‘white prestige’, a term that well- known writers such as 
Ian Fleming might well have recognized as he brought into existence a super- spy designed 
to reverse fears of long- term loss of British vitality.29 Further research informed by archival 
research and the diaries and memoirs of some of the participants at the Antarctic Treaty 
conference in late 1959 is helping to produce a more nuanced picture of how the treaty was 
negotiated, signed, and then presented to the wider world, one that highlights the anxieties 
as well as the ambitions with which its creators wrestled.30
The public presentation of the Antarctic Treaty in December 1959 onwards mattered 
because of earlier interest in the political order of Antarctica from representatives of 
newly- independent India. Using archival resources in India and other Commonwealth 
countries, Sanjay Chaturvedi and Adrian Howkins have shown how India’s interest in the 
current and future status of the polar continent was caught up with broader concerns that 
decolonized states should engage (and be engaged by others) on ‘big ticket’ issues such as 
nuclear disarmament, the status of global spaces such as Antarctica and the oceans, and 
the role of institutions such as the UN.31 Four years earlier, the Bandung Conference initi-
ated the creation of the Non- Aligned Movement (NAM), with an explicit agenda: on the 
one hand, to resist Cold War superpower rivalries, and, on the other hand, to agitate and 
promote for what was later to be termed a new international (political) economic order. 
India was one of the first members of the NAM.
Chaturvedi in particular has explored why India did not pursue a more radical agenda, 
one that threw into sharper relief  the ‘colonial legacy of territorial claims’. When the 
Indian government expressed a desire to place the ‘Question of Antarctica’ on to the 
UN agenda in February 1956, it provoked a hostile reaction from Commonwealth allies 
and claimant states Australia, New Zealand, and the UK. It also found little favour with 
the two superpowers and semi- claimants, the United States and the Soviet Union, and 
other claimants such as Argentina and Chile. India’s UN diplomatic representatives 
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and  political leadership did not challenge the territorial claims per se, as Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru noted in May 1958:
We are not challenging anyone’s rights there [in Antarctica]. But it has become important more 
specifically because of its possible experimentation of atomic weapons and the like, that the 
matter be considered by the UN . . . the fact that Antarctica contains many very important 
minerals – especially atomic energy minerals – is one of the reasons why this area is attractive to 
various countries. We thought it would be desirable to have a discussion about this in the UN.32
The future prospect of experimentation and exploitation was used to anticipate an 
Antarctic future that was clearly deemed undesirable by the Indian leadership – either 
a nuclear test site and/or yet another site for established powers to extract resources. 
Alternatively, such a resource- based future might have been more desirable if  India was 
involved with the decision making, especially where it occurred in places that appeared to 
be on the edge of the world of sovereign states and claims to exclusive authority. Ultimately, 
however, Britain and its Commonwealth allies clamped down on India’s interventions, and 
any proposals by senior political figures to relinquish territorial claims were quashed.
Although the Indian proposals have received considerable attention, the then leader 
of the opposition in New Zealand, Walter Nash, offered an arguably more unsettling 
vision that also deserves scrutiny. In January 1956, Nash proposed that New Zealand 
should relinquish its claim and posited the notion that the international community 
should govern the polar continent. Nash’s ballon d’essai drew alarm and criticism in equal 
measure both within and beyond New Zealand. Up to that point, Commonwealth and 
American negotiators had been engaged in talks about how to manage their collective 
interests, and from the British point of view, how it might be possible to encourage the 
United States to join the claimant club and thus help restrain the interests of the Soviet 
Union. Nash changed his tune when elected prime minister, instead working closely with 
New Zealand’s political allies to not only maintain New Zealand’s territorial claim, but 
also to facilitate US access to the Ross Sea sector of Antarctica as part of the IGY.33 
The alarmed response to Nash’s initial suggestion signals the powerful commitment to 
Antarctica as colonial – and not international – space.
Six weeks of intense negotiations produced a short treaty, which used the widely 
cited Article IV to manage the vexing issue of territorial claims and ownership of the 
Antarctic. It offered an interregnum resolution: claimant states were not asked to cede 
their  sovereign rights, while non- claimants were not expected to recognize the existence 
of those claims to Antarctic sovereignty. The semi- claimants, the Soviet Union and the 
United States, reserved their rights to make future claims and ensured that access to 
the polar continent was unfettered by territorial claims. Moreover, the treaty’s area of 
 application, Article VI, acknowledged that
The provisions of the present Treaty shall apply to the area south of 60° South Latitude, includ-
ing all ice shelves, but nothing in the present Treaty shall prejudice or in any way affect the rights, 
or the exercise of the rights, of any State under international law with regard to the high seas 
within that area. Colonialism is thus enshrined by the Treaty, albeit with the proviso that colonial 
claims do not have to be universally recognized.
When the Antarctic Treaty parties gathered for their first consultative meeting in 
Canberra in 1961, it might have appeared that Antarctic colonialism had successfully 
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evolved into a scientific internationalism. The twelve participants in Washington DC 
accumulated for themselves an epistemic and legal authority through past exploration, 
mapping, exploitation, and settlement. They also helped to establish a material culture, 
which helped to archive and represent that engagement through flags, plaques, sample 
collection, journals, and photographs. Now they gave themselves a treaty basis for that 
authority and devised Article IV of the Treaty as a facilitating device, which allowed all the 
signatories (claimant and non- claimant alike) to defer their colonial ambitions. These acts 
of deferral were claimed to be enlightened and far- sighted, buttressed by scientific and 
environmental authority. The evocation of ‘political anaesthesia’ seems appropriate in the 
manner in which it masked rather than resolved underlying tensions and ambitions, and 
reinforced unequal power relations and patterns of domination, albeit through scientific- 
political and technical discourses and practices. The claimant states – their claims based 
on either ‘discovery and occupation’ or the Papal Bull – continued to lay claim to 90 
per cent of the continent, and continued to enjoy privileged roles as core members of the 
ATS. Subsequent to the Treaty, there have been no new colonial claims to Antarctican 
territory, but neither did the original ones disappear.
ASIA–ANTARCTIC ENGAGEMENTS AND POLAR 
ORIENTALISM
With due acknowledgement to Edward Said,34 the term ‘polar orientalism’ is used here 
to draw attention to how a growing Asian interest and engagement in the Antarctic 
once provoked (and still provokes) unease from the original signatories to the Antarctic 
Treaty.35 Australia and New Zealand’s intense efforts to ban Japan from Antarctican 
ownership, by legal means, points to one manifestation of this unease. In Said’s original 
formulation, orientalism represented three different things – first, a body of thought 
and practice produced by western academics, journalists, explorers and governments 
about the Middle East and South West Asia; second, a mode of thought which invents a 
fundamental distinction between a modern West and a backward Orient; and third, as a 
form of episteme that authorizes and legitimates Western control and domination over 
the Middle East. While Said’s intervention has attracted scholarly and political criticism, 
sympathetic authors have taken his insights to infer that attention should be paid to how 
scholarly and political structures enable and constrain understandings of other places, 
peoples and cultures.
One of Said’s critics, Homi Bhabha, offered a rather different view of orientalism 
and colonial discourses more generally. For Bhabha, orientalism is better conceived as a 
more ambivalent mode of representation. The colonial view of the native and the colony 
as interminably backward and primitive is not a stable one. In Bhabha’s reading, the 
native can also be cast as capable of reform and ‘improvement’. Teasing out the ‘good 
native’ from the ‘bad native’ becomes, in his reading of British colonial rule in India, a 
major preoccupation of colonial authorities.36 Colonialism and colonial cultures become 
defined more by ambivalence and anxiousness rather than by expressions of hegemony 
and domination.
But even to consider ‘polar orientalism’ demands us to be cautious about how terms like 
‘rising Asia’ and ‘Asian century’ are put to strategic use. As Jamie Gillen notes,
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Relatedly, a last concern with the Asian Century is the term’s clear link to roots in the long 
established and problematic ontological binary dividing Asia from the West and the Orient from 
the Occident. Bundling ‘Asia’ as a super- organic body circulating above the world and driving 
all manner of patterns of globalization in the current century masks the heterogeneity in and of 
Asia and packages what is arguably three- fourths of the world’s population and its biggest land 
area into one digestible ‘thing’.37
What we can take away from a postcolonial polar orientalism perspective is twin track. 
The first is to consider further how growing interests from states and regions judged 
to be largely external to human encounter with Antarctica caused unease and anxiety, 
provoking a determination by Western states to reinforce their claims to legitimacy and 
precedence. The second is to investigate further the rise of what we term neo- colonial 
powers, originating in Asia and elsewhere in the world. A postcolonial sensibility alerts 
us, as a consequence, to how power and knowledge are put to work in this contemporary 
Antarctic context.
While the nascent Antarctic Treaty parties managed the Indian interventions in the 1950s, 
the emerging ATS managed the entry of new members by controlling admission criteria. 
In the 1980s, amid rising interest in Antarctica’s natural resources and demands for a new 
international economic order, Asian and Latin American states such as China, Brazil, and 
India became ever more interested in the fate of the polar continent and Southern Ocean. 
Within a decade, these countries and others from the global South became Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Parties to the ATS, ushering in a distinctly new phase of membership at a time 
of growing interest and attention to the ‘Question of Antarctica’.
In retrospect, we can trace what an orientalist analysis might see as a distinction 
created between ‘bad’ and ‘good’ Asians. The ‘good Asians’ involved what we might term 
‘Antarctic Treaty’ mimicry (in Bhabha’s terms) as new consultative parties such as China 
and India established and populated research stations and began national programmes of 
Antarctic research. The second strand (‘the bad Asians’) was led by Malaysia, a country 
that had experienced at first hand anti- colonial turbulence, known colloquially as the 
‘Malayan Emergency’, in the 1950s. Spurred on by parallel developments, especially the 
signing of the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention, the Malaysian govern-
ment explicitly questioned the territorial and resource status of the Antarctic continent. It 
pointed the finger at the Euro- American states, which designed and signed the Antarctic 
Treaty and questioned their political and scientific authority to speak on behalf  of a 
global community. As Prime Minister Mohammed Mahathir remarked in 1983,
Where there is some merit in the [Antarctic] Treaty, it is nonetheless an agreement between a 
select group of countries, and does not reflect the true feelings of members of the United Nations 
or their just claim. A new international agreement is required so that historical episodes are not 
made into facts to substantiate claims.38
When it reserved the right to a future territorial claim to Antarctica in the 1940s, Japan 
was a ‘bad’ Asian state which needed to be legislated into submission through the Treaty 
of Peace; subsequent to its participation in the IGY and its accession to the Treaty, Japan 
shifted into the ranks of the ‘good’.
From 1983 onwards, Malaysia used the forum of the United Nations General Assembly 
to raise the ‘Question of Antarctica’. In the 1980s, Malaysia and its allies were particularly 
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concerned about the status of the mineral resource negotiations (CRAMRA 1982–1988) 
and the implications for the international legal status of the Antarctic. CRAMRA’s 
origins were inspired by earlier living resource negotiations in the 1970s (resulting in 
CCAMLR) and intended to be a forward- looking intervention designed to provide some 
‘ground rules’ for the possible mineral exploitation of Antarctica. Malaysia contended 
that the ATS, notwithstanding the recent membership of China and India, remained an 
exclusive club created by a select group of nations which happened to be involved in the 
1957–8 IGY and which were now spearheading the development of a mineral exploitation 
framework. This all served to remind the critics of the ATS that this select group appeared 
to be taking major decisions on the future fate of the polar continent and in so doing they 
were excluding many nations of the global South which, in the 1950s and 1960s, were still 
involved in anti- colonial struggles and in no position to engage on the matter. Twenty 
years later, many of these post- colonial states were still caught up in colonial legacies and 
challenges. The historic involvement of Argentina and Chile, which secured independence 
in the nineteenth century, proved how unusual their experience was compared to many 
parts of Africa and Asia. In 1982, pressure from then- developing states had resulted in the 
United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea III, which declared the deep seabed – 
another terra nullius – as the common heritage of mankind (sic). Under UNCLOS III, any 
revenue made from deep seabed mining must be shared with developing states; the deep 
seabed was no longer simply available for mining by whichever state could get there first. 
This anti- colonial shift of a significant portion of the Earth’s surface and its resources 
created an unsettling political environment for the handful of states who laid claim to 
Antarctica and its resources.
The ‘Question of Antarctica’, as the framing suggested, sought to unsettle the ‘answer’ 
provided by the Antarctic Treaty in 1959. It suggested that there was a ‘question’ that still 
demanded attention from the wider international community. The reaction within and 
beyond the ATS was, at the time, intriguing. The ATS membership was hostile to the inter-
vention, and strikingly a claimant state, Australia, was charged with representing the ATS 
within the UN. Another reaction was to question the ‘credentials’ of a ‘tropical country’ 
such as Malaysia to advocate interest in the ‘white continent’. Such crude environmental 
determinism was not, however, applied to Australia. Others questioned the motivations 
of the Malaysian government and speculated on a rapacious attempt to grab a share of 
the alleged resource wealth of Antarctica. The CRAMRA negotiations invited, almost by 
their mere existence, such speculation about potential resource wealth.
The diplomatic history associated with the ‘Question of Antarctica’ has been addressed 
and evaluated by the British historian Peter Beck.39 But in more recent years, Malaysian 
scholars have written on the country’s interest and engagement with Antarctica, including 
the decision to become a signatory in 2011 after a period of ‘constructive engagement’ 
with Consultative Parties.40 In 2002, for example, Malaysia was ‘invited to observe’ the 
ATCM (Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting) and in 2004 became a member of SCAR 
(Scientific Commission on Antarctic Research).41 Within a decade one of the strongest 
critics of the ATS had become a signatory, embarked on a national Antarctic programme 
and participated in the 2007/8 IPY. As with Japan, Malaysia appeared to shift into the 
‘good’.
Malaysia’s UN campaigning coincided with a different response to the ‘Question of 
Antarctica’. India and other Asian states such as China were not actively involved in 
M4137-DODDS_Part 1 & 2.indd   61 16/11/2016   08:13
62  Handbook on the politics of Antarctica
Antarctic politics and science in the 1960s and 1970s, even if  they were concerned with 
access to the resources of the Southern Ocean and the influence of the region on their 
weather patterns in the case of the Indian monsoon. However, it is worth bearing in mind 
that India, as a member of the NAM, was supportive of new proposals in the 1970s to 
explore how the global community as a whole might manage Antarctica’s resources, as 
well as those of the deep seabed and outer space. Prime Minister Indira Ghandi reminded 
her audiences in the early 1980s that the Indian Ocean linked India to Antarctica, as 
preparations began in earnest for the first Indian expedition to the far south in 1981.
India’s first expedition led to the establishment of its first research station and the 
start of India’s direct engagement with Antarctica. As with earlier European and North 
American explorers, flags and inscriptions were left on the ice; subsequent interest 
mounted in being involved with the ATS, as it negotiated living resource management. 
Indian scientists also began to investigate the geological and meteorological connec-
tions between Antarctica and India, and their research proposals echoed earlier work 
by southern hemispheric states – such as Argentina, Chile, South Africa, New Zealand, 
and Australia – all of which have imagined themselves as ‘gateways’ to the Antarctic and 
Southern Ocean, as well as being fundamentally connected to those southerly spaces. The 
ATS was altered when India and China were admitted, with some haste, as consultative 
parties. The ‘good’ Asian in this context was capable of reform and regulation. The deci-
sion to embrace both Asian states was unquestionably driven by countervailing pressures, 
as the NAM and UN members led by other states, notably Malaysia, pressed for greater 
accountability and challenged the right of the ATS to act on behalf  of the wider interna-
tional community. All of this was further heightened in the 1980s as the ATS found itself  
under greater scrutiny and criticism from environmental groups, which took issue with the 
CRAMRA negotiations. Throughout that decade and beyond, the ATS membership was 
altered in terms of numbers and distribution by the influx of new members from Asia and 
Latin America, who were prepared to accept the epistemic authority of the ATS.
Ironically, perhaps, China, South Korea, and India’s scientific base- building pro-
grammes have been cause for some alarm by those original signatories, as they increas-
ingly make their presence felt on the polar continent. China has established four research 
stations and at the time of writing and has plans for a fifth, leaving commentators in 
Europe, North America, and Australasia to reflect on not only the polar research budgets 
for Asian Antarctic activities but also on the long- term implications of this investment. 
As The Economist opined in November 2013,
China is steadily implementing its considerable polar ambitions. Over the past two decades its 
yearly Antarctic spending has increased from $20m to $55m, some three times the country’s 
investment in the Arctic. There are many reasons to stake a claim, not least to bolster national 
pride and global geopolitical clout. The goal of the current five- year polar plan, according to 
Chen Lianzeng, the deputy head of China’s Arctic and Antarctic administration, is to increase 
the country’s status and influence, in order to protect its ‘polar rights’.42
One interesting reaction was to be detected in Australia when it was announced that 
China had established a station in 2008 at Dome A, an area in the ‘Australian Antarctic 
Territory’ that was so remote that it took repeated land- based attempts to reach that part 
of Antarctica. The underlying reaction appeared to be one of shame and disappointment 
that Australia was not in the position to claim that particular Antarctic ‘first’. A year 
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before, the Australian commentators Anthony Bergin and Marcus Haward released a 
pamphlet entitled ‘Frozen Assets: Securing Australia’s Antarctic Future’, which seemed 
to coincide with a broader exhibition of what Dodds and Hemmings termed ‘frontier 
vigilantism’ – an imaginative geography that positioned Chinese, Indian, and South 
Korean Antarctic activity as worrisome and in the Australian case, threatening to their 
interests in the Australian Antarctic Territory.43 Under the terms of the Antarctic Treaty 
and associated legal instruments, such as the Madrid Protocol, the geographical location 
of research stations is subject to contestation solely on the grounds of scientific value and 
environmental impact. Claimant states cannot, for instance, object to the construction of 
a new base simply because it happens to be in their claimed territory.
Australia and other claimants have, nevertheless, clearly reacted with alarm as larger 
states, such as China, have located research stations around the Antarctic in a manner 
reminiscent of the United States and Soviet Union/Russia – in other words, a form of 
what we might think of as colonial mimicry or recolonization. China, India, and South 
Korea all participate in Antarctic place- naming and use exactly the same sorts of nation-
alistic, patriotic, and commercial sponsorship and symbols that European and North 
American states deployed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the Australian 
media, there is no shortage of articles complaining that the AAT (Australian Antarctic 
Territory) is vulnerable to this external intervention and that the consensus- based ATS is 
insufficiently robust to challenge such opportunism on the part of newer members. The 
2014 Australian Senate Committee’s report on Australia’s future role in Antarctica and 
the Southern Ocean recommended further investment and involvement in the region. The 
report also reflected on what it termed ‘emerging players’ and noted:
Much has been written and said in recent years about the increasing interest of ‘new players’ in 
the Antarctic region. A number of emerging nations including China, India, Malaysia and the 
Republic of Korea are rapidly increasing their investments and activities in the region, giving 
rise to speculation about the nature of their interests, and concern about the declining influence 
of the traditional Antarctic powers. In particular, the growing profile of China as an Antarctic 
actor was mentioned frequently to the committee. China joined the Antarctic Treaty in 1983, but 
its engagement was relatively modest until this century. In the last ten years China has signifi-
cantly increased its investment in the Antarctic region, including more than doubling spending 
on Antarctic science and logistics, and building new bases on the continent itself, including in the 
Australian Antarctic Territory. This has provoked public soul- searching in Australia with fears 
expressed that the country was being ‘over- taken’ and ‘overwhelmed’ by a country with greater 
infrastructural reach and resource need.44
Alongside other states, such as South Korea and Japan, this contributes to a broader 
concern of a ‘rising Asia’ gradually becoming more dominant in the overall governance 
of the Antarctic.
The concern over investment, spending, and interests has also manifested itself  
in debates and controversies regarding marine protection areas (MPA). Australia, 
New Zealand, the United States and other original signatories to the Antarctic Treaty 
routinely note their concern about the reluctance of Russia, China and the Ukraine to 
agree to the establishment of marine- protected areas in Eastern Antarctica and the Ross 
Sea. A longer- standing antagonism exists between Australia and New Zealand and Japan 
and its ‘scientific whaling’ in the Southern Ocean. Russia and China have been accused 
of being intent on prospecting for mineral resources, despite the prohibition contained 
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within the Madrid Protocol. What is apparent is that the status accorded to the value of 
consensus in the ATS is changing – in previous generations ‘consensus’ would have been 
viewed as something to be celebrated; now it is more likely to invite cynicism about how 
countries can exercise a ‘veto’ and thus prevent consensus from coagulating.
All of the above feeds a southerly polar orientalism, which is fundamentally  suspicious 
of East Asian states, Ukraine and Russia, and their motivations for being involved in 
Antarctic and Southern Ocean activities. Aspiring countries such as Belarus (which 
has explicitly noted the natural resource value of Antarctica) and Iran are placed into a 
similar category, with their interest in Antarctica deemed intrinsically suspicious. At the 
same time, claimant states continue to act in a manner that evokes a colonial- era past, for 
instance Britain’s renaming of a large part of the Antarctic Peninsula as ‘Queen Elizabeth 
Land’ in December 2012 in tribute to the Queen’s fiftieth year as sovereign of the United 
Kingdom and Commonwealth. Other claimant states have long taken an interest in 
resource management, and sought preferential access to fishing grounds in the Southern 
Ocean. So while Europeans and Australasians are urged to remain vigilant, we might 
wonder how unique East and South Asian states are when it comes to shoring up their 
interests in Antarctica. If  anything, those newer members have simply copied the example 
of older member states; the difference being that their science budgets can now exceed 
that of the UK (in the case of South Korea), while India carried out its own expedition 
to the South Pole in 2010.
Australia has been particularly aggressive in its territorial management of what it 
claims as its sovereign oceans in the polar south. Since the early 2000s Australia has 
vigorously resisted Japanese whaling, not globally, but only in the Antarctican waters 
that it claims as its own. Under the terms of the Antarctic Treaty, Japan is not obliged 
to recognize Australia’s claims to sections of the Southern Ocean, and so, in another 
enactment of colonial mimicry, it treats those waters as unowned high seas and conducts 
whaling in them. Although it was a whaling nation itself  until 1978, Australia has reacted 
with outrage – both diplomatically and in media discourse – to the presence of Japanese 
whalers in ‘its’ Antarctic waters. Despite its membership of the ATS, and despite the 
legality of its polar whaling, in Australian politics and popular discourse, Japan has again 
shifted into the register of the ‘bad’ Asian states in Antarctica.
In December 2013, the Chinese icebreaker Xue Long effected a rescue that offers an 
interesting concluding vignette. A stranded Russian vessel, containing a group of  sailors, 
scientists, civilians, and journalists associated with the ‘Spirit of  Mawson’ Expedition, 
was trapped in sea ice. The expedition was attempting to recreate the scientific work 
and travel of  the 1911–13 Australasian Antarctic Expedition, led by Douglas Mawson. 
Previous efforts to rescue the Spirit of  Mawson expedition had failed owing to  inclement 
weather and sea ice. Although it was already involved with the construction of  a fourth 
Antarctic research station, the Chinese icebreaker diverted its mission in order to rescue 
the passengers with its helicopter. The passengers were eventually transferred to an 
Australian polar vessel and returned to Hobart. What struck some western commen-
tators in the aftermath was that China had effected the rescue as opposed to original 
Antarctic Treaty members, such as Australia or France. Yet the incident was not unique: 
three years earlier, a South Korean icebreaker rescued the crew of a Russian fishing 
vessel, which was operating in the Ross Sea region. So perhaps, once again, we have an 
outdated perception of  exceptionality here, labouring under the misapprehension that 
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Asian involvement and expertise is somehow unusual or strange in an Antarctic and 
Southern Ocean setting.
CONCLUSIONS
The ‘post- colonial Antarctic’ as a term draws attention to the colonial histories and 
geographies that shape polar imaginaries and practices.45 There is no one ‘post- colonial 
Antarctic’; rather it is means of recognizing that colonialism is never fixed in the past, 
and that the past must be invoked to make sense of the present. As Derek Gregory has 
noted, a postcolonial approach or sensibility helps us to understand the enduring  ‘colonial 
present’, including the role of colonial imaginaries, knowledges and practices. Such an 
approach also reminds us that the division of the polar continent into seven rival ter-
ritorial claims and an unclaimed sector is artificial and arbitrary. Colonial powers have 
worked hard, however, to diminish that sense of being highly artificial by emphasizing 
their settling labour, and by framing their colonization efforts as objectively scientific. The 
seven claimants, despite repeated attempts to colonize and settle their polar claims, have 
never enjoyed exclusive rights or sovereign control. The United States and Russia con-
tinue to reserve their rights to make territorial claims in the future, while rejecting all exist-
ing claims. Others, particularly China, India, South Korea, and Brazil, have also sought 
through their investment and research stations and related infrastructure to make their 
presence felt on the Antarctic and the Southern Ocean. However, while  Euro- American 
countries have located their investment and presence in longer traditions of exploration, 
science, and discovery, Asian engagement is more often than not framed in explicitly 
resource- strategic terms. China’s research station programme, for example, feeds into a 
wider canvas characterized by anxieties about China’s investment and involvement with 
other continents, especially Africa.46 All of which appears breathtaking, given the extraor-
dinary exploitation of Antarctica’s living resources, such as seals and whales, by colonial 
European powers and the United States.
A postcolonial analysis of Antarctica is alert to not only the legacy of the colonial past 
on contemporary power and knowledge structures, but also to how neo- colonial powers 
might be challenging earlier Euro- American forms of domination. Do the debates and 
controversies over marine- protected areas in the Southern Ocean point to competing 
colonial visions? For claimant states, such as Australia and New Zealand, environmental- 
scientific authority is invoked for ensuring that the large swathes of ‘their waters’ are 
managed in the name of stewardship and sovereignty. Others, such as China, Russia, and 
Ukraine, push an alternative agenda, which is eager to control and harvest the Southern 
Ocean through the prism of resource exploitation while at the same time challenging the 
dominant Euro- American conservation/rational use model, as espoused by CCAMLR. 
The future fate of marine- protected areas might well offer pointers as to whether it is 
 possible to generate new forms of co- operative and fair ventures in the Antarctic.
Postcolonial Antarctic scholars might wish to think further about how the future 
 governance of the Antarctic connects with a broader conversation about whether it is 
possible to imagine, think about, and practice a different kind of politics and governance 
for the polar continent and Southern Ocean. An alternative postcolonial framing of, and 
for, southern spaces would be attentive to the enduring presence of dominant  frameworks, 
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while mindful of alternative voices and bodies of knowledge. Geophysical change in 
Antarctic ice sheets and shifts in the biology of the Southern Ocean can and do play a 
part in generating new geopolitical concerns and visions, ranging from renewed interest 
by claimant states to consolidate their resource and territorial interests to non- claimants 
demanding that their interests and rights are respected. Tracing out the postcolonial in 
the Antarctic remains a necessary work in progress, as we reflect further on the different 
ways in which the politics of the Antarctic manifests itself.
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